

“Where Mammon Reigns”: The Roman Catholic Church's response to industrialization in Northern Rhodesia's Copperbelt, 1930s-1960s

Draft paper

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This paper aims at exploring the implications of the disparity between the Zambian situation and the commonly held expectations that “modernity” (defined as the introduction of new technology, the process of urbanization and the consequent social changes) would necessarily result in the withdrawal of religion from the public domain (what we call secularization). Moreover, secularism (being defined as scientific and rational thinking) was regarded as a precondition, a necessity, for “modern” development in Africa. Mudimbe argues forcefully that this kind of Western discourse caused the construction or “invention” of Africa.¹ In particular the discourse in which the African “Other”, which is irrational, superstitious and primitive is contrasted to Western “Self” which claims scientific rationality and objectivity. While not wishing to dispute Mudimbe’s observation, I would argue that his approach is rather static and leaves little space for changes in Westerners’ perceptions, due both to historical processes at home and in Africa itself.

Fixed representations of religion in Africa have been under attack before. In 1982, Karen Fields observed that Africanist scholars regarded religious revival and protest as a phase in the evolutionary march towards perfected 'modern' forms, namely secular workers' organisations and political parties, thereby understating the impact of the religious movement themselves.²

¹ F. Stenger, *White Fathers in Colonial Central Africa: a critical examination of V.Y. Mudimbe's Theories on Missionary Discourse in Africa* (Lit Verlag, Munster, Hamburg, London 2001), 1.

² K. Fields, 'Charismatic Religion as Popular Protest: The Ordinary and the Extraordinary in Social Movements' in *Theory and Society*, Vol. 11, No. 3 (May 1982), 321-361, 324.

Crucially, these evolutionary assumptions have influenced the way in which Zambian history has been represented. Perhaps it is important in this context to remind ourselves that throughout the whole period stretching from the 1920s to the early 1970s, it was indeed tempting to compare Zambia's historical trajectory to that of Europe, especially insofar as the processes of urbanization and industrialization were concerned. Technology in the mining industry was considered to be cutting edge; moreover Zambia was one of the highly urbanized countries in sub-Saharan Africa.³ Not surprisingly, much research focused on the Copperbelt, with numerous studies being produced on labour and migration, urbanization and social change.⁴ Most of these studies were underpinned by the notion that 'urbanization [...] seemed to be a teleological process, a movement towards a known end point that would be nothing less than a Western-style industrial modernity.'⁵

While successfully challenging this notion and the simplistic 'metanarrative of modernization' in which it resulted, Ferguson's ethnography of the Copperbelt in the 1980s overlooked an essential component of 'modernist' accounts, namely the expected onset of a secularization process. His disregard for the religious sphere can perhaps be explained by the narrow focus of his fieldwork, during which he mainly interviewed 'young male mineworkers.' Interestingly, Ferguson has only recently come to realize the shortcomings of this 'Eurocentric evolutionary narrative', stating that 'Christian mission organizations are arguably more important today in Africa than ever [...] but are strangely relegated to the colonial past in the imagination of

³ D. Potts, 'Counter-urbanization on the Zambian Copperbelt? Interpretations and implications', *Urban Studies*, 42 (4) (2005), 583–609. Potts has recently shown that Zambia's urbanisation rates have been systematically overstated.

⁴ E.g. A.L. Epstein, *Politics in an Urban Community* (Manchester, Manchester University Press 1958), J.C. Mitchell, *Social Networks in Urban Situations: Analyses of Personal Relationships in Central African Towns* (Manchester: Manchester University Press 1969) J. L. Partpart, *Labor and Capital on the African Copperbelt* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press 1983), H.S. Meebelo, *African proletarians and Colonial Capitalism: The Origins, Growth and Struggles of the Zambian Labour Movement to 1964* (Lusaka: Kenneth Kaunda Foundation 1986).

⁵ J. Ferguson, *Expectations of Modernity: Myths and Meaning of Urban Life on the Zambian Copperbelt* (Berkeley, L.A., London: University of California Press, 1999), 5.

much contemporary scholarship'⁶ In this respect I concur with Asad, who has resisted identifying either virtues or vices of secularism or religiosity, proposing instead to describe 'the forms that articulate them, the powers they release or disable.' In this paper, I will concentrate on the public role of Catholicism.

Until the 1960s, Catholicism has been regarded as the anti-thesis of the modern nation-state. After the Catholic Church had been politically disenfranchised in Europe at the end of the 19th century, its answer to the rise of the secularist state and competing ideologies was the development of a Catholic Social Doctrine, which was spread by means of successive papal encyclicals. Positioning itself between capitalism and socialism, the Church commented on a number of issues relating to the (negative) consequences of industrialization, capitalism and communism. The attempt of the Catholic Church to maintain its influence in public affairs, however, was not restricted to Europe. Indeed, it can be argued that the missionary societies' adaptation of this social doctrine enabled them to successfully reposition themselves vis-à-vis the emerging African nations. From the 1920s, missionaries gradually deserted a political theology that had led to the creation of ethnic Christian 'kingdoms' and replaced it with an adherence to a national church that could speak out on public matters.

The assumption that the Catholic Church was inherently anti-modern has affected the academic analysis of the rise of nationalism in Europe, which, being framed by modernization theories, has largely ignored the role of Catholicism.⁷ While the study of nationalism in Africa has been on the whole more inclusive, partly as a result of the presence of a number of prominent

⁶ J. Ferguson, *Global Shadow. Africa in the Neoliberal World Order* (Durham and London: Duke University Press 2006), 98.

⁷ C. Clark, W. Kaisers (eds.) *Culture Wars: Secular-Catholic Conflict in Nineteenth-Century Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2003).

scholars with a Catholic background⁸, studies addressing the relationship between missionary activities and African nationalism in Zambia have mainly focused on the role played by Protestantism and its allied welfare societies.⁹ Yet, as will be argued in this paper, to understand the prominent status attained by the Catholic Church after Zambia's Independence, it is crucial to comprehend the Catholic Church's political position in the 1950s. Moreover, to appreciate the seeming contradictoriness of Catholic responses to nationalism, it is necessary to acknowledge the existence of intellectual differences among the missionaries, resulting from their individual backgrounds. As Gray rightly observed: 'The Kulturkampf, the Loi de la Separation, the Risorgimento and the Lateran treaties, all meant that Catholic missionaries from Germany, Belgium and Italy approached the colonial state from a profoundly different standpoint from that of Anglo-Saxon and Scandinavian missionaries.'¹⁰ In addition, missionaries were fashioned by generational differences and their lived experiences. This paper, therefore, will confine itself to one specific Catholic missionary denomination, the Missionaries of Africa, better known as the White Fathers. My aim is to show how their ambivalence towards the rise of secularism and working class ideologies shaped their reaction to, first, the urbanization process of the 1930s and, second, the rise of African nationalism in the 1950s.

II

In order to situate missionary apprehensions about emerging secular ideologies, I want to take the audience back to the General Missionary Conference of Northern Rhodesia held in Broken

⁸ Hastings, Mudimbe, Gray,

⁹ Ipenburg, Meebelo. Garvey dedicates a few pages to the general impact of Catholic education on nationalism, 82-88.

¹⁰ R. Gray, *Black Christians and White Missionaries* (Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 1990), 92.

Hill, from 15 to 21st July 1931.¹¹ Despite the conference openly associating itself ‘with the political aspirations of the Black rather than the White’¹², the literature produced by the gathering typified a number of central missionary concerns or ‘fears’:

1. The fear of secular education

‘We are quite confident that religion must be in the first place, and there is danger that it may be forced into the second place by those who are keen on secular education. Religion may be forced into the background...but I feel certain that as long as the present Government is in charge of the situation those fears will be found to be groundless.’¹³

2. The fear of nationalism

‘The very names associated with this movement are important- Michael Collins, Mustapha Kemal, Lenin, Trotsky, Ghandi and Sun Yat Sen...We, as people whose task it is to speak the Kingdom, must ask ourselves whether such a movement is Christian or if there is a place within Christianity for such a movement.’¹⁴

3. The fear of industrialization

In China industrialism is coming with irresistible onrush upon an unprepared people. *But the most amazing industrial development in our own day in the whole world is taking place within a few miles of Broken Hill. A few years ago the Copper Belt was just a primeval bush; to-day people of both races are being drawn together there in vast numbers.*¹⁵

¹¹ Evangelisation. Being the Report of the General Missionary Conference of Northern Rhodesia. Held in Broken Hill, July 15-21st, 1931 (Lovedale Press).

¹² Evangelisation (1931), Foreword. What the Conference has Done, by Rev. J.R. Fell, pp 1-14, 6

¹³ Reply to the Right Rev. Bishop May, D.D., pp 19-20, 20.

¹⁴ ‘Christian Missions in relation to World Movements’ by Rev. A.M. Chirgwin, pp 21-24, 21.

¹⁵ Ibid. 22.

From the conviction that 'without Christian faith there will be no evolution of the Native's good qualities, but a revolution caused by the display of his passions'¹⁶, the new course of evangelization expressed itself as follows: 'The most important thing is that we should integrate our Missionary movement with the other great movements of the world in order that they shall become means of extending the Kingdom of our Lord Jesus Christ.'¹⁷

The conference is remarkable as the addresses show an intense attentiveness to international political developments, which, the missionaries felt, had the potential to threaten the stability and uncontested hegemony of Christianity in Northern Rhodesia. To what extent then, do missionaries actively turn these threats into opportunities, i.e. to ensure that nationalism would take on Christian characteristics? Or as Roland Oliver points out, the question was not "Will there be a revolution?" but "Who will lead the Revolution."¹⁸

III

The missionaries' initial resistance to urbanization, as Peel noted, should be understood in the context of their fear of secularism, as their home countries had originally been 'profoundly and exclusively Christian' but were now seeing the authority of religion being weakened 'by urbanization ... by secular working class movements and by the growth of secular knowledge and science.' As a response, Peel continues, 'the missionaries aspired to create in Africa a piously observant Christian society like that which they believed pre-industrial Europe had had.'¹⁹ A

¹⁶ 'The First Approach to the Pagan Native', by Rev. Fr. J. Spindel, S.J. , pp. 25-30, 26.

¹⁷ Ibid. 24.

¹⁸ Roland Olivier quoted in A. Hastings, *A History of African Christianity 1950-1975* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1979), 98.

¹⁹ J.D.Y. Peel *The Christianization of African society: some possible models* in E. Fashole-Luke, R. Gray, A. Hastings, G. Tasié (eds) *Christianity in Independent Africa* (Rex Collings, London 1978), 443-454, 450.

Christian theocracy was indeed the model the White Fathers had adhered to while evangelizing the Northern Province, where they successfully created a great number of Roman Catholic settlements.²⁰ In the missionaries' eyes, labour migration posed a serious threat to these carefully constructed Christian 'kingdoms', both as a result of the loss of their leaders – the catechists and teachers who had played such a crucial role in expanding the mission in the first place – and of the threat of 'godlessness' in towns, which, in the missionary mind, had the potential to 'contaminate' the rural areas as migrants returned. Labour migration and urbanization, in short, undermined their model of mission, which had hitherto focused solely on the rural population surrounding the mission stations.²¹

In 1920, the White Fathers were already concerned that over 3,000 of "their" Christians were scattered in the Diaspora (Congo, Tanganyika, South Africa),²² but the opening of the mines within the territory brought the problem of labour migration closer to home; it led to the establishment of more permanent urban communities and, as a result of shorter distances, the more frequent coming and going of migrants.²³ The coming and going of migrants was regarded as a threat by the White Fathers, who described these urban dwellers as 'too often arrogant, areligious and amoral, estranged from their own people, and with their minds full of revolutionary and Marxist-Leninist propaganda.'²⁴ Preoccupied by Protestant rivalry and the perceived anti-Catholicism of the colonial government, the missionaries also feared that the assumed immoral behaviour of Catholic migrants in the towns would reflect poorly on the

²⁰ Robert I. Rotberg, *Christian and the Creation of Northern-Rhodesia 1880-1924* (Princeton, New Jersey 1965), 33.

²¹ A. Shorter, *Cross & Flag: The "White Fathers" during the Colonial Scramble 1892-1914* (Maryknoll: Orbis Books 2006), 172.

²² ZWFA, ANR/13 1920-1921 : Bangweolo Vicariate

²³ Merle Davids

²⁴ ZWFA, ANR/53, 1938-1939, Lwangwa Vicariate . Ideas about communism must have filtered through from South-Africa. On the experience of labour migrants in the region, see Taylor, Lehmann (1961), p. 122.

Catholic Church as a whole: 'Our flock of Lubemba, how do they behave in this milieu where Mammon reigns in undisputed mastery?'²⁵

These qualms, however, did not lead to the establishment of White Fathers mission in the towns. Until the early 1930s African Christians on the Copperbelt, of any denomination, were left to their own devices. The White Fathers resisted the prospect of expanding their mission to town. In retrospective, practical reasons were advanced for their refusal, like the sheer distance and lack of transport, as Bishop Pailloux explained: 'It was in 1928 that the first lorry was seen in Bangweolo Vicariate and most of the missionaries of my generation had to wait some twenty years before going to the Copperbelt.'²⁶ Moreover, Copperbelt was seen to be outside their jurisdiction.

Taylor and Lehmann have argued that the absence of priests on the Copperbelt, contrary to missionary expectations, resulted in the formation of thriving Church communities, giving African Christians the opportunity to take the initiative and leadership.²⁷ This was certainly true for the protestant community on the Copperbelt, which in 1925 established its own 'Union Church in the Copperbelt.' Examples of Catholic initiatives in this direction are few, but informative. Gray gives the example of a catechist from Luapula province who was sent to the Copperbelt to assist in the transport of provisions. He decided to stay in town for the next 17 years, during which he built a flourishing Catholic community, helped by other voluntary catechists.²⁸ We can also read that in 1927 Catholic workers had come to an agreement with the management of the mining companies to build temporary church-cum-schools.²⁹ When, in 1929, the White Fathers Fr van Sambeek and Fr Etienne visit the Copperbelt for a fortnight to assess the situation, they 'were amazed' to note that

²⁵ The missionaries believed for instance that the Protestants conspired to blame the Bemba Catholics for the outbreak of the 1935 Copperbelt strike. O'Shea (1986), 265.

²⁶ Quoted in O'Shea (1986), 74. In addition the Great North Road was only constructed in 1925. Traveling could take a month.

²⁷ Taylor, Lehmann, 37.

²⁸ Gray...

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despite the absence of their own catechists and the 'uncoordinated' nature of evangelical efforts, 'many Bemba speaking Christians from the North were still behaving properly, especially those who had managed to come with their families ...'³⁰

In 1931, Italian Franciscan missionaries opened a mission on the Copperbelt, working on the premises that urbanization was an irreversible process and had the potential to contribute to the successful Catholic evangelization process. In 1934, Fr. Mazzieri, in an address entitled 'Are the mines a disaster or a benefit for our immigrant Christians', spoke of urban life as a 'potential cure' for certain 'native' vices: 'a life of order and work...makes him a strenuous worker; even physically he becomes stronger. He learns hygiene and cleanliness, his social feelings improve....' Another benefit, as the White Fathers had noted with pride, is that 'the (protestant) mine authorities acknowledged that the Catholic church effectively acted as a bulwark against Bolshevism'³¹ Most crucially, town turned out to be a successful place for expansion: 'many of them meet hundred of Christians whom they see praying and singing on Sundays; so many pagans who had no knowledge of the Christian religion come in touch with Christianity, and this may be, with the Grace of God, a good opportunity for the propagation of the Gospel.'³² In fact, in 1931 2550 African Catholics were counted in the Copperbelt. Significantly, out of the 295 baptisms recorded in 1932, 261 originated from White Father missions in Northern Province.³³ In 1937, Roman Catholics were at least equal in number to all non-Roman adherents combined.³⁴

The Catholic missionaries' obsession with the rise of communism in the Copperbelt was informed by the European experience, where "Bolshevism" had posed a serious threat to the

³⁰ ZWFA, ANR/29, 1929-1930, Bangweolo Vicariate

³¹ M. O'Shea (1986), 112.

³² From Fr. Mazzieri's paper entitled 'Are the mines a disaster or a benefit for our immigrant Christians' (1934) quoted in M. O'Shea (1986), 289.

³³ O'Shea, 270.

³⁴ Taylor, 41.

Catholic leadership from the 1920s onwards.³⁵ The Vatican's response to this confrontation was to activate and emancipate the laity, who were subsequently trained and organised to take on political responsibilities and confront communism. This worldwide movement, called the Catholic Action, was reproduced in Africa and came into play in Northern Rhodesia in the 1930s. While there is no evidence of 'organised communism' on the Copperbelt or in the territory, the missionaries believed the lay movements to be an important deterrent against the forces of "unbelief":

There is also a revival of pagan practices and beliefs, especially in time of hardships and trials, as well as new anti-Christian doctrines (bolshevism, sects, etc). We rely a lot on Catholic Action and the newly introduced *Legio Mariae* to thwart the Devil's efforts to bring down the Church, which has grown so much in size and strength...³⁶

IV

Having successfully worked towards the creation of a Catholic defence force, missionary fears of communism re-emerged as a consequence of the rise of nationalism in the 1950s. This was part of a general trend, as Mudimbe noted:

Despite the fact that the Church had trained most of the nationalist leaders and intellectuals ... many a missionary did not welcome the outcome of ideologies of otherness and did not at all like doctrines of African independence. Besides political fears, there was a feeling that these new theories were opening a new era and meant the end of missionary initiatives in Africa.³⁷

In order to meet the requirements interact with the state, for instance to advance their interest in the field of education, health and broadcasting, the Catholic missionary societies mooted the idea of the establishment of a Catholic Secretariat in Lusaka in the early 1950s. The missionaries resolve to speak out on public matters resulted in the publication of the first pastoral letter in 1953 in response to the unrest among the African population following the proposed introduction of the Federation

³⁵ A. Hastings, 'The Churches and Democracy: reviewing a relationship' in P. Gifford (ed), *The Christian Churches and the democratization of Africa* (E.J. Brill Leiden, New York, Koln 1995), 36-47, 39.

³⁶ ZWFA, ANR/55, 1939-1945 Bangweolo Vicariate. The supposedly Godlessness of the Europeans in the Copperbelt was countered with the Moral Regeneration movement, O'Shea, 192.

³⁷ Mudimbe, *The Invention of Africa*, 59.

of Northern Rhodesia, Southern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. The silence of the Catholic Church on the imposition of Federation had in fact been interpreted by the nationalists as a pro-Federation stance, as Bishop of Abercorn noted: 'Catholic Africans are reproaching us for not taking up their defence in the struggle...The more so as quite a number of Protestant missionaries have declared themselves openly against Federation ...'³⁸

The pastoral letter aimed to instruct the Catholic clergy, first, by cautioning them to refrain from political activities: 'As a question of principle, it is well to recall the very strong prohibition included in Can. 139, with regard to the participation of the clergy in the political affairs of any Country.' It then expressed the overall purpose of the pastoral letter: 'But as human beings, and as citizens of N. Rhodesia, [the Africans] have the legitimate right to hold their own political views on the problem at stake, and, as long as Federation is not an accomplished fact, they have also the right within the limits of true moderation and through constitutional means to endeavour to postpone and even prevent the formation of the proposed Central African Federation.'

However, in practice, the pastoral instructions did not produce a consensus regarding the proper 'apostolic response' to political tension. Most clergy in Northern Province seemed unsympathetic to the nationalist cause and forbade catechists to become members of political parties. The missionaries' fears were not without foundation, especially if we go by the lived experiences of the White Fathers in Northern Province. The missionaries at the time were confronted with the loss of large numbers of converts to the emerging Lumpa movement, led by its prophetess, Alice Lenshina, and the *Mutima* church, a Catholic breakaway movement. In addition, tension between nationalist movements and missionaries gradually built up. White Fathers going on 'tour' in the 1950s encountered increased resistance from the villagers, as one

³⁸ Quote from letter Vicar Apostolic to Apostolic Delegate, Mombasa quoted in Garvey 83-84.

priest wrote in exasperation: 'It seems they mix the whole thing of Congress, Regina, Basungu, school and church.'³⁹ At the same time, many missionaries failed to take the nationalist aspirations seriously, which, Rotberg observed at the time, reflected a general mood:

While the tinder of racial antagonism everywhere in Central Africa was bursting into flame, white officials, businessmen, missionaries, and settlers assured me that the animosities so apparent in 1959 reflected recent conditions and particular political mistakes only. They blamed ambitious African agitators and a few irresponsible white "communists" for fueling and setting alight the conflagration that then appeared to have spread south from Ghana and Kenya to enflame Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland.⁴⁰

This frame of mind might explain why some missionaries persisted in attacking the credentials of the nationalist movement. One can still trace a good number of heated exchanges between priests and local nationalist party leaders in which the former accused the latter of promoting communism. The African National Congress was not shy to defend itself: 'your circular (in Bemba) gives the impression that the African National Congress is controlled by Communists...we know and are convinced that our African National Congress is more Christian than any party in this country...'⁴¹ These types of conflict and misunderstanding can also be shown in a small exchange of ideas between imprisoned nationalist leaders and a visiting White Father. The priest talked to 20 people who came from his parish and was shocked to hear the following:

They said: 1. God does not exist because nobody has ever seen him 2. Jesus never came to earth 3. there are no sins committed, everything is permitted 4. why if there is a God he does not punish the Europeans. 5. Catholic priests are liars because they keep a lot of secrets. (5) 6. the pagan religion is better than the Catholic one. Formerly people were happy now they are thrown in gaol.⁴²

On the basis of these observations the priest concurred with the prison superintendent that 'Communism doctrine' was taught in the prison. Yet, a great number of Bemba Catholics

³⁹ ZWF-MD-59 Mulanga Mission Diary, August 1955, 70.

⁴⁰ R.I. Rotberg, *The Rise of Nationalism in Central Africa. The Making of Malawi and Zambia 1873-1964* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press 1967), vii.

⁴¹ *Kasama Archdiocese Archives* (KAA), [file number] J.C.M. Ng'andu, Provincial General Secretary Africa Northern Province to Right Rev. Mgr. Pailloux, Kasama 22 October 1957.

⁴² ZWFA, 1-M-hi-34 Fr. P. Sanders, *Diary of a Visit to Marandellas Gaol* (1963), 4.

attended his religious service, while others told him that: ‘they pray alone now but would come to pray with us as soon as they had Independence.’

Tensions in the Northern Province between Catholic priests and local political leaders persisted into the early 1960s and continued to revolve around the missionaries’ alarm at the presumed anti-Christian nature of nationalism. This led a local ANC leader to write the following: ‘Your Lordship, we are sorry that you are living in such great fears. You are living like you do now because you don’t want to closely examine the African Way of movement. Our way is clear and Christlike. There is nothing between us but God who gave Africa to the Africans.’⁴³

Yet, other examples point to an increased political sensitivity on the part of a number of missionaries. The White Fathers of Mulilansolo mission, for instance, entered the government’s blacklist for harbouring fugitive freedom fighters like Simon Kapwepwe and their refusal to cooperate with the police in its investigations of the disturbances of 1961:

‘the head constable asked the superior what he would do if a man, UNIP, or any other lawbreaker, came into his house. The superior answered that he, as a missionary and priest, only cared about people’s attitude towards God, and never inquired about their political aspirations... Moreover, let it remain clear that a priest has his professional secrets, just as a medical doctor has. A priest cannot spread all the confidences, entrusted to him as a priest, of which anyway he has no definite proof...’⁴⁴

This same generation of White Fathers also no longer regarded “paganism” as a threat, as Mudimbe observed elsewhere:

from the 1950s onwards new orientations appeared for the indigenization of the Church ... the “pagan culture” is considered and analyzed as an abandoned field in which God’s

⁴³ KAA, [file number] J.C.M. Ng’andu, Provincial General Secretary Africa Northern Province to Right Rev. Mgr. Pailloux, Kasama 22 October 1957.

⁴⁴ ZWFA, 5-ZWF-MD-71 Mulilansolo Mission Diary, ‘A form of answer on the letter of P.J. Walsh, S.J. Secretary if the Archbishop, date 2nd January 1962’, 10b. On request of the Federal Government, Bishop Furstenberg transferred the priests to other areas, see H. Hinfelaar, *Bemba-speaking Women*, 146.

signs already exist. A new vocabulary arises and new forms of evangelization: Africanization, indigenization, naturalization, adaptation of Christianity.⁴⁵

Perceived threats to Christianity had undergone a redefinition and were branded as 'pastoral issues', caused by social injustice. The apparent breakdown of the Christian family life was now explained by 'years of cultural alienation and labour migration'. This change of mindset is reflected in the establishment of the Legion of Mary, a lay movement which became more popular than the Catholic Action and whose purpose was described as 'the constant waging of war against evil.'⁴⁶ The newly established Catholic Welfare Society, which counted the White Father Bishop Pailloux as its member, instructed its (young) members 'to play an influential role in trade unions and political movements.'⁴⁷ The outspoken Jesuit Fr. Patrick Walsh had a more direct way of gaining political influence among the new leaders by organising political seminars for former Catholic students like Simon Katilung, and Albert Sokota. In the course of the years, Walsh became a close confidant of Kenneth Kaunda.

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Education remained central to the Churches' policies of control. In 1951 the Papal Encyclical envisioned that: 'The youth, especially those of them who have gone through the high schools, will control the destiny of their countries in the future. The importance of education at the elementary, secondary, and university levels is recognized as deserving the greatest care.' Not surprisingly, in 1954 the Catholic Church operated 38% of the mission primary schools in Northern Rhodesia.

⁴⁵ Mudimbe, 56.

⁴⁶ Hinfelaar, History, 139-140

⁴⁷ Hinfelaar, 168.

The second pastoral letter of 1958, addressing the issue of racial disparity, reflects the widening horizon of the Catholic hierarchy, who now more confidently defend the Bishops' right to speak out on public matters according to the established social doctrine:

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'It is unnecessary for us to prove our authority to instruct you in the context of social affairs. Our mandate is that the Church was ordered by Jesus Christ, her Founder, to "Go... preach the Gospel to the whole of creation". (Mark 16:15). Given this mandate the Church has the right and duty to teach and guide Christians not alone in purely religious matters but also in social, economic and political affairs in so far as they are connected with the moral order...'⁴⁸

However, differentiation among missionaries regarding the response to national issues remained. This is partly a result of the continued missionaries' affinity to the microcosm of the mission station, which resulted in observing the world from a narrow, mostly, ethnic base. At the same time, one can find those missionaries who started to draw from far wider ideologies, including socialism.⁴⁹

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⁴⁸ p. 65. In it, the Catholic Church speaks against 'false' nationalism and Marxist's models of society, it envisages Northern Rhodesia as a 'Christian Civilisation'.

⁴⁹ A. Hastings, *The Construction of Nationhood: Ethnicity, Religion and Nationalism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1997), 162.